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NONCONCEPTUAL CONTENT, CAUSAL THEORY,
AND REALISM
ABSTRACT: In this paper the connections between the noncon-
ceptual content of perceptual states and realism are considered.
In particular, I investigate the argument for realism that uses the
notion of nonconceptual content, specifically the version proposed
by Raftopoulos in Cognition and Perception. To evaluate the argu-
ment two forms of realism are identified: (1) correlation realism
(CR), according to which distinctions in perceptual content corre-
late with distinctions in the environment, and (2) ontological re-
alism (OR), according to which perceptual content and perceived
reality are both organized according to the same set of ontological
categories. First, it is argued that the distinction between noncon-
ceptual and conceptual content is irrelevant for the justification of
CR. In particular, the notion of nonconceptual content is neither
sufficient nor is it necessary for such justification. Second, it is
stated that the version of the causal theory of perception that is
used in the argument considered already assumes ontological re-
alism. What is more, the weaker version of the causal theory, that
does not presuppose OR, is too weak to justify ontological realism
in combination with assumptions about nonconceptual content
and the successfulness of perception.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One classical debate in the philosophy of perception concerns the ques-
tion of realism: whether the content of our perceptual states faithfully
represents reality or is, rather, a kind of inner construction produced
by mental activities. Recently, the realist position has gained support
from contemporary discussions regarding the conceptual and noncon-
ceptual nature of perceptual content. Intuitively, it is quite tempting to
propose that: (1) if there is a nonconceptual stage of perceptual pro-
cessing, and (2) the perceptual content produced during that stage is
caused by external entities, then the perceptual system has a direct link
to the environment (see e.g., Pylyshyn 2007). On such a basis it may
be argued that the structure of the nonconceptual content of perceptual
states, as independent from the subjective conceptual scheme, matches
the structure of the perceived reality.
This paper has two main goals. First, to properly judge if the notion
of nonconceptual content can be used to formulate a convincing argu-
ment for perceptual realism, a precise definition of perceptual realism
is needed. In the paper I specify two versions of perceptual realism:
weaker correlation realism and stronger ontological realism. As such,
the discussion extends beyond the common, intuitive description of per-
ceptual realism connected with the metaphor of “carving the world in
the right places.”
Second, I consider whether correlation realism or ontological real-
ism can be justified using the notion of nonconceptual content. I ar-
gue that the connection between nonconceptual content and realism is
weaker than it seems. Specifically, I state that the justification of corre-
lation realism is independent of the distinction between conceptual and
nonconceptual content. What is more, I argue that ontological realism
is not justified, but is in fact assumed by the popular formulation of the
causal theory of perception — and without this assumption it cannot
be justified using the notion of nonconceptual content.
In the concluding sections I consider other ideas, independent from
the notion of nonconceptual content, which can either be used to justify
perceptual realism in its ontological version or to reformulate the whole
realism/constructivism debate. In particular, I sketch out a research
program for investigating the ontology of perceptual content.
In discussing the connections between perceptual realism and non-
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conceptual content I focus on the argument for realism proposed by
Raftopoulos (2009), which is representative of a more general prac-
tice of connecting nonconceptual content and the causal approach to
perception with realism. The argument by Raftopoulos is significant
because it directly uses the notion of nonconceptual content to justify
perceptual realism. What is more, Raftopoulos proposes a clear under-
standing of nonconceptual content that is closely connected to the way
in which the perceptual system processes information.
2. NONCONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND THE PERCEPTUAL PROCESS
In his work on vision, Raftopoulos (e.g., 2006; 2008; 2009) persua-
sively argues that there exists a stage of visual information processing
that is purely bottom-up, i.e., that is not under direct top-down influ-
ence from higher-level cognitive mechanisms. This stage is what he
calls ‘perception’, which he distinguishes from ‘sensation’ — the initial
phase that lacks any representational content, and which is connected
with the activity of retinal receptors and cells in the V1 visual cortex
— and ‘observation’, where top-down influences are common and, be-
cause of this, where visual information is interpreted according to a
conceptual scheme.
Raftopoulos founds his proposition on psychological and neural mod-
els of visual perception. In particular, he presents data showing that
top-down influences are delayed in time (e.g., Lamme 2003), meaning
that there is a phase when visual information is processed in a solely
bottom-up fashion.1 He also refers to some influential conceptions ac-
cording to which objects are individualized2 due to grouping and seg-
mentation processes during the initial, pre-attentive stage of visual pro-
cessing (e.g., Vecera (2000)); and that they can preserve their identity
through time by applying visual indices (Pylyshyn 2001) or by creating
object-files (Kahneman et al. 1992).
According to (Raftopoulos 2009, p. 89), the output of perception is
similar to the classical 2.5D sketch described by Marr (1982). The im-
portant thing about the content of perceptual output is that it presents
objects as persisting individuals with basic spatiotemporal properties.
However, representations of objects created by perception do not en-
code details about all their visual features, and they do not present ob-
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jects as members of general categories (like dogs or tables). To obtain
a more detailed representation, the top-down mechanisms, especially
those connected with the categorization of objects and object-based at-
tention, have to be introduced.
By distinguishing the bottom-up phase of visual processing,
Raftopoulos is able to characterize nonconceptual content in a way that
is more closely connected to the actual functioning of the visual system
than other popular approaches referring to the fine-grained character
of perceptual content (Tye 1995), perceptual representations of impos-
sible states (Crane 1988), or animal and infant cognition (Peacocke
2001). On Raftopoulos’s approach, nonconceptual content can be de-
fined in the following way:
NCC: Content of perceptual states is nonconceptual iff it is
produced by a process that is not directly modulated by top-
down mechanisms.
When a process is directly modulated by a top-down mechanism,
it is conducted relatively to the resources used by that mechanism —
the structure and content of a conceptual scheme possessed by a sub-
ject, his memories, expectations, beliefs, etc. On the contrary, a purely
bottom-up process operates according to stable rules3 implemented in
the structure of the perceptual system, which are independent of the
perceiver’s conceptual framework. Further, in this paper, I understand
the NCC to include the claim that there are perceptual states with non-
conceptual content.
It is worth noting that Raftopoulos (2009, p. 47) distinguishes di-
rect and indirect top-down influences. The indirect top-down influence,
connected with the functioning of spatial attention, does not affect the
process itself, but may determine which stimuli will be processed and
also make the processing more efficient — for example by designat-
ing a visual location where stimuli are likely to appear. According to
Raftopoulos’s conception, its presence does not constitute a threat to
the nonconceptual status of content.
3. THE ARGUMENT FOR REALISM
Raftopoulos characterizes (2009, p. 327–328, 336) realism in intuitive
terms, as the idea that perceptual content presents the world correctly,
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that perceptual output presents things as they really are, or that percep-
tion “carves the world in the right places”. Analogously, constructivism
may be characterized as the thesis according to which perceptual con-
tent does not present the structure of reality correctly, but is to some
degree a reality-independent product of the mind.
The argument (Raftopoulos 2009, p. 342) for realism depends on
three main elements: the existence of nonconceptual content of per-
ceptual states, the causal theory of perception, and the successfulness
of perception. Nonconceptual content was defined in the previous sec-
tion (NCC). According to Raftopoulos (2009, p. 344), the causal theory
of perception can be characterized in the following way:
CT: The perceptual system retrieves visual information about
the environment by causal interactions with objects and their
properties that constitute that environment.
The successfulness of perception is the simple idea that:
SP: In ordinary conditions, interactions with the environment
guided by the content of perceptual states are successful.
According to CT, entities in the perceiver’s environment causally in-
fluence the visual system in a way that allows the perceptual mechanism
to obtain information regarding the environment. After the initial ‘sen-
sation’ stage, this information is perceptually processed in a bottom-up
fashion. Such processing, in accordance with the definition of NCC,
will produce perceptual states with nonconceptual content. Due to
the bottom-up nature of perceptual mechanisms, the visual informa-
tion gathered causally from objects cannot be modified and distorted
by any conceptual influences. As we know from our ordinary expe-
rience, the actions we undertake when guided by the content of our
perceptual states are usually successful — so SP is probably true.
If (1) our perceptual states have nonconceptual content, and (2) this
content is constructed by virtue of causal links with the environment
without any conceptual influences, and (3) this content allows us to
successfully interact with the environment, then, it seems, realism is
justified — perception does usually “carve the world in the right places”.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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4. TWO FORMS OF REALISM
The intuitive formulation of realism, presented earlier, can be specified
in two ways: as correlation realism and as ontological realism. Corre-
lation realism is the thesis that:
CR: (1) every distinction presented in a perceptual state cor-
responds to a distinction in the fragment of reality that is
perceived; and
(2) distinctions are mapped monotonically: the order and dif-
ferences among distinctions in perceptual content correspond
to the order and differences among distinctions in the frag-
ment of reality that is perceived.
If CR is true, then every perceptual distinction — e.g. the edge of
an object, a border between two regions of different color, etc. — is
correlated with exactly one distinction in reality — e.g. a big change in
matter density over a small area, or a difference in reflectance proper-
ties — and no two different perceptual distinctions are correlated with
the same distinction in reality. The second condition (monotonicity) has
been added to omit the possibility that in every part of physical reality
there is some sort of distinction, so that even random arrangements of
distinctions in perceptual content fulfill condition (1).
The opposite of CR can be called ‘correlation constructivism’. Ac-
cording to this view, either perceptual distinctions do not match any dis-
tinctions in perceived reality or they match them in some non-monotonic
fashion.
Ontological realism is the idea that:
OR: (1) Entities presented in perceptual content and entities
constituting reality belong to the same ontological categories;
and
(2) for every entity that is presented within the content of
a perceptual state as belonging to an ontological category X,
there is a corresponding entity within the perceived fragment
of reality that belongs to the same ontological category (X).
If OR is right, then the ontological categories that organize percep-
tual content are the same as those that organize reality. For example, if
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our perceptual content presents objects possessing properties then real-
ity also contains objects with properties. What is more (condition (2)),
every entity presented in perceptual content as belonging to a given
ontological category is matched with exactly one entity in reality that
belongs to the same ontological category. In addition, no two differ-
ent entities contained in the perceptual content can represent the same
real entity. For example, according to OR, every object and property
presented in perception matches exactly one real object and one real
property, and different perceptual objects and properties represent dif-
ferent real objects and properties.
The opposition to ontological realism — ontological constructivism
— is the claim that perceptual content and reality are organized ac-
cording to different sets of ontological categories or that there is no
proper — as described above — matching between perceptual and real
entities.
Ontological realism entails correlation realism in the same way that
correlation constructivism entails ontological constructivism. If percep-
tual content and perceived reality are organized according to the same
ontological categories, and there is a mapping between perceptual and
real entities, then perceptual distinctions are also correlated with real
distinctions, since they designate entities in the visual field. However,
as will become clear, ontological realism is not entailed by correlation
realism.
5. NONCONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND CORRELATION REALISM
In this section, I investigate the relation between nonconceptual content
and correlation realism. It seems that the combination of NCC, CT, and
SP is able to justify correlation realism, and the metaphorical phrase
“carving the world in the right places” may be interpreted as expressing
CR.
The structure of this argument can be specified in the following way:
1) A visual system comes into contact with the environ-
ment by causal interactions with objects and proper-
ties in the world.
2) Due to the bottom-up nature of perceptual processing,
perceptual states have nonconceptual content.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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3) Actions based on the nonconceptual content of per-
ceptual states are usually successful.
If 1)–3) are true, then 4) perceptual distinctions match real distinctions
as described by correlation realism.
It is clear that NCC, CT, and SP do not constitute a deductive ar-
gument for correlation realism. Many, but quite bizarre, alternatives
for correlation realism may be proposed. For example, it can be imag-
ined that 1) and 2) are fulfilled, but that perceptual content does not
match real distinctions; however, our actions based upon perceptual
content are still accurate because they are immediately corrected by a
non-perceptual mechanism.
The justification of CR based on NCC, CT, and SP rather takes the
form of an inference to the best explanation. It seems that correla-
tion realism is the most plausible explanation of how actions based on
nonconceptual content, which is constructed from causally-gathered vi-
sual information, are successful. Similarly, as in the well-known argu-
ment for scientific realism (Putnam 1975), other explanations look too
strange or miraculous.
Below, I weaken the connection between NCC and correlation real-
ism by arguing that postulating nonconceptual content fpr perceptual
states is neither necessary nor sufficient for the justification of CR.
To demonstrate that NCC is not necessary, an argument can be con-
structed in which CT and SP are combined with perceptual states pos-
sessing conceptual content. Let’s assume that there is no purely bottom-
up stage of the perceptual process. Instead, visual information pro-
cessing is always directly modulated by top-down mechanisms. Analo-
gously, as in the definition NCC, such a process will produce perceptual
states with conceptual content.
It seems that in such a situation correlation realism can still be jus-
tified. According to CT, visual information is causally transferred to
the perceptual system. Then, perception processes that information,
partially by using a conceptual framework connected to higher-order
cognitive abilities. The output of that process, in accordance with SP,
allows a subject to successfully interact with the environment. It seems
that in such a case correlation realism is no less justified than in the
original argument, which uses the notion of nonconceptual content. If
perceptual states with conceptual content allow for successful interac-
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9 Błażej Skrzypulec
tions, then distinctions presented in their content are likely to corre-
spond to distinctions in the environment. It seems that the CR is also
the best explanation in the case of conceptual content.
In fact, it looks like the successfulness of perception is sufficient for
the justification of CR, which is a rather weak form of realism, and that
the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content is con-
tingent in relation to this justification. To make the existence of noncon-
ceptual content a necessary condition for the justification of correlation
realism, it has to be shown that conceptual content is not able to guar-
antee the successfulness of actions in ordinary situations. For example,
it may be argued that the conceptual schemes used in producing con-
ceptual content are too subjective or context-dependent. However, the
existence of a common (at least for humans) set of basic concepts also
seems possible, and that by using that set reliable conceptual content
may be produced.
The above considerations suggest that the notion of nonconceptual
content is not necessary for justifying correlation realism. The fact that
it is also not sufficient can be shown by constructing an argument with
NCC and CT, but without SP. As has been stated, according to CT there is
a causal link that transfers visual information between objects and the
perceptual system, and nonconceptual content is produced by bottom-
up mechanisms, which are free of conceptual influences. However,
without the assumption about the successfulness of perception, cor-
relation realism does not seem to be more plausible than correlation
constructivism.
The sufficiency of NCC in the justification of correlation realism
would be guaranteed if SP were entailed by the existence of noncon-
ceptual content. Obviously, the conceptual variant of correlation con-
structivism is excluded by NCC — there are no conceptual influences
on the perceptual process. But there is still a space for a ‘causal’ (or
‘structural’) version of it. It may be the case that the stable rules, im-
plemented in the perceptual system, that govern bottom-up processing,
systematically distort visual information and create nonconceptual con-
tent that presents distinctions that do not correlate with any distinctions
in the environment. Such a result additionally strengthens the thesis
that what is really essential for justifying CR is the assumption about
the successfulness of perception; which seems to be coherent with the
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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existence of nonconceptual content as well as with its nonexistence.
Of course, if the description and interpretation of the perceptual
process offered by Raftopoulos is correct, then perceptual states do
have nonconceptual content that is produced by mechanisms that do
not systematically distort visual information. If this is correct, then the
counterarguments presented above do not describe actual situations.
However, even if our actions are actually successful when we rely on
the nonconceptual content of perceptual states, this does not mean that
NCC is a necessary or sufficient element of the justification of correla-
tion realism.
6. CAUSAL THEORY AND ONTOLOGICAL REALISM
Above, I argued that the conjunction of NCC, CT, and SP justifies corre-
lation realism, but that the thesis about the nonconceptual content of
perceptual states does not play an important role in the argument. Now,
I will consider whether NCC, CT, and SP are able to justify ontological
realism. Additionally, CR may be added to the argument’s premises, as
it seems that correlation realism is justified by the NCC–CT–SP combi-
nation.
The structure of this argument can be specified in the following way:
1) A visual system comes into the contact with the envi-
ronment through causal interactions with objects and
properties in the world.
2) Due to the bottom-up nature of perceptual processing,
perceptual states have nonconceptual content.
3) Actions based on the nonconceptual content of per-
ceptual states are usually successful.
4) Perceptual distinctions match real distinctions, as de-
scribed by correlation realism.
If 1)–4) are true, then 5) the content of perceptual states and of re-
ality are organized according to the same set of ontological categories,
as described by ontological realism.
According to OR, perceptual content and reality are organized ac-
cording to the same ontological categories. From our experience it is
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obvious that perceptual content presents the world as constituted by ob-
jects that possess properties. Given that, the argument for OR should
show that the reality that is in fact represented by perceptual content
is itself also composed of objects with properties.
However, the way in which Raftopoulos specifies the causal connec-
tion between perceiving subject and the environment (2009, p. 334)
suggests that the thesis about the ‘objects-with-properties’ structure of
reality is not justified, but is in fact assumed by the argument for real-
ism.
According to CT, visual information is provided by causal links be-
tween objects and properties in the world and the perceptual system.
CT assumes that reality consists of objects with properties and that from
this, together with knowledge about the content of our ordinary per-
ceptual states, it can be immediately inferred that reality and percep-
tual content are organized according to the same ontological categories.
This, together with the SP assumption, also justifies the second part of
OR — if our actions based on perceptual content are successful, there
should be a mapping from perceptual objects to real objects.
In order to justify ontological realism without assuming an essential
part of it, the weaker version of CT should be introduced. It can be
formulated in the following way:
WCT: The perceptual system retrieves visual information about
the environment through causal interactions with entities that
constitute the environment.
WTC still implies that there are some beings that provide visual in-
formation by causal interactions, but does not specify to what ontolog-
ical categories they belong.
However, accepting WCT and combining it with the NCC and SP
does not allow us to justify ontological realism. To demonstrate this,
a simple counterargument may be formulated. Let’s assume that phys-
ical structure of reality does not consist of objects but is built up of
continuous fields of energy and/or matter. In such a case, WCT may be
satisfied: the perceptual system receives visual information from causal
interactions with entities (continuous fields). This information may be
processed in a bottom-up fashion, producing states with nonconceptual
content. In addition, SP (as well as correlation realism) can be true in
the above situation, since every perceptual distinction may match a real
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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distinction — e.g. what we perceive as borders of objects are correlated
with rapid changes in the density of fields — and so a subject is able
to successfully interact with the environment. Nevertheless, ontological
realism would be false, since there are no actual objects in the perceived
reality.
It may still be argued that even if WCT — together with NCC, SP,
and CR — does not entail ontological realism, ontological realism is
still the best explanation of how WCT, NCC, SP, and CR are jointly
true, and in that sense their combination justifies OR. On the other
hand, the counterargument describing the objectless field-ontology of
physical reality suggests that there are alternative ways to explain the
WCT–NCC–SP–CR conjunction. Such an objectless ontology may seem
counterintuitive, however, since the categories of entities used in physi-
cal explanations are often different from those that are ordinarily present
in perceptual content, and there is no generally accepted answer about
the relation between basic physical elements and regular medium-sized
objects. In addition, the possibility of the non-existence of objects has
been widely discussed in analytic metaphysics (see e.g., van Inwagen
1990; Unger 1979).
It seems that the CT thesis already assumes ontological realism,
whereas the weaker CTW, which omits that assumption, does not allow
justifying OR on the basis of NCC, SP, and CR. From this, the conclusion
can be drawn that in order to justify ontological realism without com-
mitting a petitio principii, some additional premises have to be added
or an independent argument should be presented that will justify the
stronger (CT) version of the causal theory.
7. REALISM BEYOND NONCONCEPTUAL CONTENT
I have argued that the notion of nonconceptual content is not particu-
larly useful in justifying ontological realism. Relying on this negative
result, it may be asked whether there is a more promising approach to
the question of perceptual, ontological realism. I believe that there are
three positive propositions that are worth investigating further.
First, it may be postulated that the whole debate about perceptual
realism and perceptual constructivism is based on a faulty notion of
content, according to which elements of perceptual content constitute
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a model of the external world. According to this approach, it may be
stated that in fact there is no such thing as perceptual content, and
the functioning of the cognitive system can be sufficiently explained
by referring to causal interactions between an organism and the envi-
ronment (e.g. Hutto 2006). Alternatively, a notion of content can be
preserved, but it may be denied that it models entities in the environ-
ment in any way, for example by claiming that content concerns the
fulfillment of some laws of interactions to which the neural system is
tuned (e.g. O’Regan 2011).
The above approach resolves the realism/constructivism debate sim-
ply by showing that the whole problem rests on a mistake. However,
there are also ways in which the realism/constructivism discussion can
be considered without breaking the link between content and the en-
vironment. Within the frameworks of disjunctivism or direct realism it
may be claimed that elements of perceptual content do not represent
external entities, but rather that content is constituted by such entities.
Obviously this allows proponents of such theories to very easily justify
ontological realism, because here there is no difference between ele-
ments of content and entities in the environment. But this position faces
well-known problems in explaining illusory and hallucinatory states.
Probably the most interesting approach to investigating the prob-
lem of perceptual realism is to preserve the notion of content under-
stood as being composed of elements that represent entities in the en-
vironment, and try to justify ontological realism without invoking the
notion of nonconceptual content. A clear formulation of ontological,
perceptual realism opens the way for a research program that connects
philosophical ontology with the philosophy of perception and empiri-
cal investigation. In such an approach, three elements are needed in
order to justify ontological realism. First, an ontological theory of per-
ceptual content is needed that can utilize, inter alia, mereological and
topological notions (Smith 1998). Some ideas are already present in
classical analytic (Russell 1956) and phenomenological (Husserl 2001)
works, but these were not developed in connection with contemporary
empirical investigations concerning perception. Second, an ontological
theory of physical elements that interact with the visual system should
be formulated. The last element is a model that explains the connection
between causal influence from certain elements of the environment and
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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the presence of various elements of perceptual content. Investigations
conducted as part of such a research program would reveal to what ex-
tent and under what conditions the elements presented in perceptual
content match the ontological arrangement of entities in the environ-
ment.
8. CONCLUSION
I have considered the connections between the nonconceptual content
of perceptual states and perceptual realism. In particular, I have inves-
tigated the argument for realism, in the version proposed by Raftopou-
los, using the notion of nonconceptual content, the causal theory of
perception, and the assumption about the successfulness of perception.
In order to evaluate the argument, I distinguished two forms of realism:
weaker correlation realism and stronger ontological realism. I have ar-
gued that (1) the distinction between nonconceptual and conceptual
content is not relevant for the justification of correlation realism, and
(2) the version of the causal theory that does not presuppose ontolog-
ical realism is too weak to justify ontological realism in combination
with assumptions about nonconceptual content and the successfulness
of perception. Finally, I have sketched a program for ontological inves-
tigations concerning perpetual content that may reveal to what extent
ontological realism is true.
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Notes
1See also Pylyshyn (1999) for review and discussion concerning the gap between cog-
nition and perception.
2However, see Campbell & Martin (1997), Clark (2004), or Treisman (1999) for al-
ternative philosophical and psychological approaches.
3For examples of such rules see Kellman & Shipley (1991) (visual completion), Palmer
& Rock (1994) (figure/ground discrimination).
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